Israel conceded an enormous expanse of territorial waters to a failing enemy state that refuses to recognize its existence, under military threat by Hezbollah, who set the terms of the agreement but never committed to keeping it.
Former Prime Minister Yair Lapid published his own version regarding the issue of the maritime border deal with Lebanon. He explained that conceding Israel’s rights over the disputed area (“a few kilometers of blue water”) served Israeli interests as it was projected to “help stabilize Lebanon’s economy, weaken Hezbollah’s hold on the welfare and educational systems and create a balance of threat, wherein the Lebanese government – and even more so the Lebanese people – would force Hezbollah to honor the agreement and refrain from attacking the Karish offshore gas field”.
Lapid largely insinuates that opposition to the agreement was political and not substantive, and that he himself had acted correctly. He insists that Israel did not cave to threats from Hezbollah. To the contrary, he says, the agreement weakened Hezbollah, and the terror organization was forced to recognize Israel, while creating infrastructure targets that would be attacked the day Hezbollah dared to provoke it.
Ever since October 7, many are in the process of re-thinking political and security paradigms. Therefore, the discussion Lapid ignited is useful, and for that he should be thanked. But in the name of historical accuracy I beg to refute the picture he painted and describe the way events unfolded, leading me and my colleagues at Kohelet Policy Forum to petition Bagatz (the High Court of Justice) against promoting the deal.
First and foremost, Israel is a lawful state. If a basic law has determined that any concession of Israeli territory must be carried out only under the provisions of Basic Law: Referendum, then so it must be done. The demand to uphold the law was not a political maneuver for the opposition but a fundamental demand meant to ensure open and substantial discussion prior to signing an agreement that hands over sovereign territory to Lebanese rule.
The Court was also petitioned to weigh in on the question of signing a deal so close to the election, after the government had lost the Knesset’s trust. Contrary to Lapid’s attempt to present his government’s position as one of strength, under which production on Karish began, per his order, on the originally planned date in the face of Hezbollah threats and unaffected by them, the court accepted the government’s position that there existed an urgent and vital need to immediately sign the agreement. The decision made it clear that the Court was presented with unequivocal information regarding the severe security implications should the agreement process be halted. This reinforced what the entire Middle East understood: Israel signed an agreement under threat, and the heads of security were willing to buy “quiet” at any price, including the concession of territory under threat of terrorism and extortion.
Contrary to Lapid’s description, Lebanon rewarded Hezbollah with recognition and admiration for causing Israel to back down from the positions it had held consistently over the years during negotiations over the maritime border. Moreover, immediately after the deal was signed Hezbollah announced it still saw the absence of an agreement over the border as grounds for hostility towards Israel: as far as they were concerned, the deal did not settle the maritime border.
And as we all witnessed, the organization escalated its provocative measures against Israel and has been in a state of war since the Simchat Torah holiday on October 7. So far, Israel has avoided attacking Lebanese infrastructure. Only last week Hezbollah once again made an attempt on Karish. We haven’t heard Lapid suggest we attack civilian infrastructure in Lebanon as retaliation.
To understand whether or not we capitulated to extortion, it is necessary to know the background to the agreement. After gas was discovered in the Mediterranean, the maritime border dispute became an economic issue of some significance. In 2010, the Israeli and Lebanese governments submitted conflicting declarations to the UN regarding the maritime border between them. Lebanon declared the point labeled 23 as the westernmost point of the border, while Israel declared it to be point 1 more to the north. Israel’s position was in line with the position it had held since the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and in line with agreements both states had signed with Cyprus. The immediate economic significance of the dispute was the share each state would have in the gas field assumed to exist off the Tyre coast – the Kana-Sidon gas field. It must be stressed that the territory south of the border where the Karish gas field was discovered was never contested, and Israeli possession of it was undisputed.
In 2012, an American compromise was proposed, seeking to determine the border between the two points, so that 55% of the Kana gas-field would belong to Lebanon, and 45% to Israel. Israel agreed; Lebanon refused. When negotiations reopened between Israel and Lebanon in 2020, a new Lebanese claim materialized, according to which the border was even more to the south, at the point labeled 29, and included the territory of the newly discovered Karish field. Israel did not take such an extortive claim, obviously made only as a negotiating tactic, seriously. The talks were called off and later renewed in 2022, under the auspices of the American envoy Amos Hochstein.
Lapid assumed his role as interim Prime Minister in the days leading up to the elections set for November 1st, 2022, a short while after the drilling rig was positioned at Karish. The next day, Hezbollah sent two drones to the offshore gas field. The message was clear: it was the opening shot to negotiations conducted under the military threat of Hezbollah. In August, there were growing signs that Israel was duly intimidated and preparing to back down from nearly all its positions. On August 9, Hasan Nasrallah declared he would not allow “the pillage of Lebanon’s resources”.
The negotiations held ostensibly with the Lebanese government were, in fact, held with Hezbollah. Until the end of September, the terror organization declared its opposition to any compromise that meant Lebanese concessions. Contrary to what Lapid wrote, Israel repeatedly delayed the start of production at the Karish field. However, in the beginning of October, at the advent of “progress in the talks”, i.e., Israel further retreating from its positions, Hezbollah removed its objection. The interim government refused to reveal details of the provisional agreement to the public. Nasrallah read it and gave the green light; Israeli citizens didn’t.
Following public and parliamentary pressure, the government consented to lay the agreement on the Knesset table two weeks before the final ratification. The agreement perfectly matched Lebanon’s demands – Israel withdrew from all its positions and set point 23 as the maritime border line, with two major caveats: the first – the buoy line five kilometers out from the coastline would remain, with Israel not withdrawing and Lebanon not registering its agreement; and the second – an absolute Israeli concession of the Kana gas-field, situated south of point 23 as well, aside from a further commitment not to exploit natural resources in the entirety of the Block 17 area. In return, it was agreed that the company drilling for Lebanon would transfer 17% of its profits to Israel.
When we petitioned Bagatz, we were unaware of the details of the agreement, nor were we privy to all relevant military intelligence. Our claim focused on the demand to allow broad public discussion before the signing of an agreement, as per the basic law. Other petitions questioned the urgency of the agreement’s ratification, set as it was for only a few days before the elections, and without the Knesset’s approval.
The government’s lawyers made every counter argument they could think of to allow for a speedy ratification. Among others, they claimed that since Israel has no settled Northern maritime border, there could be no concession of territorial waters. Such a claim is extremely damaging to Israeli interests in other disputes, as well as contradictory to fundamental aspects of international law, but apparently, the goal justified the means.
In an irregular move during the hearing, the Justices convened Military Intelligence chief Aharon Haliva and Head of National Security Council Eyal Hulata behind closed doors, where they explained the significance of a refusal to sign the agreement from the security angle. What they said was not made public, but the judicial decision makes it clear that only one position was presented: rejecting the agreement meant direct harm to Israel’s’ security. Our petition was thrown out, and the ratification ensured. One day before the agreement was signed production began at Karish. The agreement was signed on October 27, 2022, one week before elections.
Government spokespeople claimed it was a fair compromise, and that leaving Karish in Israeli hands was allegedly an Israeli win. They further claimed that it was “a diplomatic achievement,” because of the ostensible recognition of Israel by Lebanon, and that the agreement bolstered deterrence.
The truth is that the Lebanese government refused to recognize Israel. There was no joint signature. Letters from both governments were delivered to the American envoy, after which each state declared its borders to the UN. The Lebanese insisted on this, and Israel gave in to their demand. In reality, Israel conceded an enormous expanse of territorial waters to a failing enemy state unwilling to recognize its existence, under military threat by Hezbollah, who set the terms of the agreement but never committed to keeping it.
To understand how we find ourselves now in the current security situation in the North, we must re-examine the gas deal with Lebanon. To do so, we must stay truthful and allow for a critical and apolitical review of the matter. Better late than never.
First published in Makor Rishon (Hebrew)
